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Abstract  
 
Unionist politicians have argued that republican political violence on the Irish border, 
during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted 
ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/unionist community in those areas. 
These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that 
has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates 
the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing republican violence during the 
1920s and the 1970s. Drawing a wide-range of theoretical literature and archival 
sources, it demonstrates that republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing 
or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. 
It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional 
sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and 
sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have 
heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of 
political violence beyond Ireland. 
 
Introduction 
 
Paying tribute to the late Ian Paisley in September 2014, Northern Ireland’s First 
Minister, Peter Robinson, described his former leader as a figure who had held together 
a beleaguered unionist community which (among other things) had ‘suffered genocide 
along the border.’1 His assertion represents particular narrative of republican political 
violence during Northern Ireland’s recent ‘troubles’.2 The sectarian violence perpetrated 
by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Ulster’s border districts, some 
unionists suggest, constituted an eliminationist campaign of ethnic cleansing or 
genocide.3  
 
There is nothing novel in this portrayal of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. It has 
been a feature of unionist rhetoric since the early 1990s. Republicans have likewise 
claimed that loyalist violence against their community constituted a form of ethnic 
cleansing.4In recent years, however, the specific suggestion that republicans pursued a 
campaign of ethnic cleansing or genocide on the border has achieved increasing 
prominence in Northern Ireland’s political discourse. Robinson has elsewhere claimed 
the PIRA committed acts of ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the border county of 
Fermanagh during the 1970s. The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was also used by four unionist 
representatives during a 2012 Northern Ireland Assembly debate, centred on a motion 
calling for the government of the Republic of Ireland to apologise for allegedly ‘creating 
what became the Provisional IRA’ after 1969.5  
 
 
This characterisation of republican violence on the border has extended to the 
discussion of the more distant past; specifically, the violence surrounding the partition of 
Ireland in the early 1920s, and consequent birth of the Northern Ireland state.6 Some 
journalists and victims campaigners have suggested that the original Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) – which emerged after 1916 and fought a violent separatist campaign 
against Britain – was likewise responsible for ‘ethnic cleansing’ and/or ‘genocide’ along 
the then newly created boundary.7 This reading of history has served an explicit political 
purpose, creating a contiguous, uncomplicated narrative of republican malevolence and 
Protestant/unionist victimhood spanning both conflicts.8 
 
In this respect, allegations of ethnic cleansing or genocide on the border resemble other 
politicised narratives of victimhood in Northern Ireland. For example, the nationalist 
narrative of anti-Catholic ‘pogroms’ in 1920s Belfast, or the republican movement’s 
comparison of unionist rule in pre-1970s Northern Ireland to apartheid era South Africa. 
They are rooted in legitimate grievance, and find expression through reference to 
international experiences that far exceeded local realities. There is one significant 
difference, however. Whereas the latter examples have rightly been dismissed within the 
scholarly literature, the narrative of republican ethnic cleansing on the border has gained 
credence from it.9  
 
Part of the problem relates to a lack of clarity in the usage of terms such as ‘ethnic 
cleansing’, which are then seized upon to justify particular claims. Henry Patterson’s 
recent book on border violence is a case in point.10 Nowhere therein does Patterson 
himself argue ethnic cleansing occurred, although he quotes other sources using the 
term. However, in a subsequent newspaper interview, he quoted a British Army officer, 
cited in the book, stating ‘what amounts to ethnic cleansing’ occurred in border areas, 
without further elaboration.11 At the book’s launch, former head of the Northern Ireland 
Civil Service, Ken Bloomfield, reportedly said the PIRA’s campaign was ethnic 
cleansing, and an academic review commends the book’s ‘dispassionate reading that 
there was a campaign along the border that could safely be described as “ethnic 
cleansing”’ (despite Patterson himself not explicitly making that claim).12 
 
Similar criticisms apply to the historical literature regarding republican violence during 
the Irish revolutionary period (1916–23). The suggestion of republican ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
on the border in the early 1920s has been emboldened by the fierce popular and 
scholarly debate concerning the alleged ethnic cleansing of Protestants in southern 
Ireland in the same period. This was sparked by the work of the late Peter Hart who 
suggested (but did not ultimately conclude) that the IRA’s persecution of the Protestant 
minority in various parts of the modern-day Republic of Ireland ‘might be termed “ethnic 
cleansing”’. Though few scholars endorse this interpretation, it has nonetheless become 
embedded in the historical discourse on the period.13 
 
Lack of clarity has been compounded by scholarly unease regarding the subject. This is, 
perhaps, because the suggestion of ethnic cleansing in the Irish context is closely bound 
with ethno-sectarian victim selection. This is certainly true of the recent literature 
regarding the ‘troubles’, where Patterson’s work has represented a continuation of 
debates concerning PIRA sectarianism.14 It is also the case with the historical literature 
on the 1920s. A small (but vocal) minority of historians have based their criticism of the 
ethnic cleansing interpretation of republican violence in southern Ireland on a rejection of 
IRA sectarianism during the period.15 By criticising the ethnic cleansing narrative, 
therefore, it might appear one is questioning the republican movement’s overt 
engagement in sectarian violence. 
 
Consequently, more moderate voices who have engaged with the issue of ethnic 
cleansing have primarily been concerned with reaffirming the sectarian realities of 
republican violence, rejecting the suggestion only in highly qualified terms. Gemma 
Clark’s recent study of violence in Munster during the Irish civil war (1922–23) has done 
so solely on the basis that republican violence was not state sanctioned, but does not 
appear to doubt its eliminationist, exclusionary designs.16 Patterson, while remaining 
somewhat non-committal, suggests that PIRA violence on the border in the 1970s and 
1980s did not reach adequate proportions to be termed ‘ethnic cleansing’, though hints  
that it might have if not for British security forces.17 Others have critiqued the ethnic  
cleansing narrative while side-lining discussion of the violence involved, instead relying 
on statistical analyses of demographic change; an approach that, while informative, fails 
to engage with the interpretative concept it purports to discuss. (Incidentally, these 
analyses found no compelling evidence to support the suggestion of ‘ethnic cleansing’ or 
genocide’ in Ireland during either conflict.)18 
 
The representation of republican violence on the Irish border amidst partition and during 
the recent ‘troubles’ is not merely of academic importance – it continues to shape 
political debates about attribution of blame for past violence and the ways in which these 
conflicts are remembered. Given the contemporary relevance of the topic, it is incumbent 
on scholars to properly interrogate the suggestion that it constituted ethnic cleansing 
and/or genocide, and to do so with appropriate conceptual precision. 
 
Accordingly, this article examines the character of this border violence during both the 
1920s and the 1970s – the most violent phases of the respective conflicts.19 It is the first 
study to compare politically motivated violence during these periods, despite the 
frequent distinctions drawn between the violence carried out by founders of the modern 
Irish state and that of the PIRA during the recent Northern Ireland conflict.20  
 
The article’s aims are threefold. Firstly, it seeks to clarify conceptual terms such as 
‘sectarianism’, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide’ as applied in the Irish case. Given the 
above-mentioned implications of the lack of terminological precision for contemporary 
public debate, such clarification is crucial.  
 
Secondly, the article interrogates a range of historical evidence to analyse and compare 
the violence during both periods. In doing so, it examines three motifs in IRA/PIRA 
violence during both periods – which form the basis of unionist accusations of ethnic 
cleansing or genocide. These are: reprisal attacks; attacks on the security forces; and 
the economic targeting of Protestant/unionist business interests. In each case, it will be 
argued that there is no persuasive evidence that a systematic campaign of ethnic 
cleansing or genocide took place during either period. Indeed, using such terms 
obscures more than it illuminates, and is arguably insensitive to the victims of these 
abhorrent practices elsewhere. 
 
Thirdly, the article introduces a new concept for considering debates about political 
violence in Ireland, functional sectarianism, defined below. This concept, we suggest, 
will help advance scholarship by understanding instances of violence in a more 
sophisticated way, moving debates beyond questions concerning moral legitimacy and 
the contemporary assignation of blame for actions during past conflict. 
 
To be clear, this approach is not meant to deny the suffering across communities during 
the two periods, nor is it an attempt to justify acts of violence. As Alex Schmid has noted, 
the academic study of political violence should offer an intellectual forum where scholars 
can discuss terrorism ‘without being suspected of sympathising with terrorists.’21 
Furthermore, we make no apologies for engaging in a debate that some scholars view  
as little more than a ‘distraction’.22 As shown above, debates about alleged ethnic 
cleansing and genocide during both periods are still current, and firmly embedded in the 
popular, political, and scholarly discourse. Clearly, it is untenable to suggest that they 
should be shelved. Rather, it is necessary to engage in detailed analysis, to clarify 
concepts, advance our understanding of both periods, and provide the basis for more 
informed public and scholarly debate. 
 
Ethnic cleansing, genocide and sectarianism – the problem of definition 
The terms ‘ethnic cleansing’, ‘genocide’, and ‘sectarianism’ have frequently been used in 
academic and media sources discussing the conflict in Ireland. However, despite, or 
perhaps because of, the sensitive and often politicised nature of these terms, the 
literature shows few attempts to define precisely what they mean. This lack of clarity has 
impaired existing debates concerning the nature and dynamics of political violence 
during both discussed periods. Recognising this, and to allow a more dispassionate 
interrogation of the application of these terms to violence in border regions of Ireland, it 
is necessary to discuss their definitions. This will involve engaging with literature beyond 
Ireland, across disciplinary boundaries.  
 
‘Ethnic cleansing’ is perhaps the most problematic term. It originates from the Wars of 
Yugoslav Succession after 1992. Drazen Petrovic argues it derives from the Serbo-Croat 
phrase ‘etnicko ciscenje’, and acquired its present day connotations from its use as a 
military term – to ‘cleanse’ an area of the enemy.23 Nevertheless, whilst the term is 
widely used, its meaning is imprecise,24 defying ‘easy definition’.25  Some workable 
definitions of the term are available, however.  
 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, defined ethnic cleansing as ‘the 
systematic [emphasis added] purge of the civilian population based on ethnic criteria, 
with the view to forcing it to abandon the territories where it lives’. He further argued that 
‘this policy was the objective of the whole conflict’ in the Former Yugoslavia.26 
Additionally, Bell-Fialkoff claims that ethnic cleansing involves ‘the expulsion of 
“undesirable” populations from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, 
political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.’27 
 
Petrovic offers an extensive definition of ethnic cleansing, worth recalling here: 
 
[A] well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically 
[emphasis added] eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of 
religious, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very 
often connected with military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible 
means, from discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law.28 
 
Petrovic’s definition is echoed in Michael Mann’s work. Mann classifies ethnic cleansing 
as ‘the removal by members of one such [ethnic] group of another such [ethnic] group 
from a locality they define as their own.’29 Whilst definitions can be either very broad or 
overly legalistic in tone, the literature agrees that ethnic cleansing usually displays the 
following features: 
 
1. It is a systematic process; 
2. It is supported by the authorities or tolerated by them; 
3. It is motivated against ethnic, national and religious characteristics and 
   directed against non-combatants; 
4. Its advocates cannot respect international law; 
5. It has different forms, from administrative measures to extermination, and can 
encompass methods such as threats and intimidation. It violates the Geneva 
Conventions and is a crime against humanity.30 
We suggest that the above characteristics provide a useful basis to test the definition of 
ethnic cleansing as applied to the Irish case in both periods, although we argue that 
state involvement or acquiescence is not necessarily required to meet the definition. 
 
If ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a difficult concept to define we might expect the term ‘genocide’ to 
be more clear-cut. Genocide, after all, has a much longer provenance, and is codified in 
international law. The term was coined by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944.31 The 
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
subsequently agreed in 1948 to make genocide an offence under international law. The 
resulting 1951 treaty defines genocide ‘as any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’. 
These were: 
 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.32 
 
There are, however, major criticisms of the UN definition. Its categories of group identity 
are too narrow, most notably excluding politics and gender.33 The wording is vague on 
the issue of ‘cultural genocide’, and, indeed, on whether-or-not genocide necessarily 
involves mass killing.34 Some ambiguity may also obtain where it is unclear if a particular 
massacre was meant to destroy a particular group ‘as such’. In these cases, the atrocity 
may be classified as a crime against humanity, rather than genocide per se.35 
 
To complicate matters further, genocide has also been criticised for its shortcomings as 
an interpretive concept. It is argued, for instance, that in placing too great an emphasis 
on proving or disproving perpetrator intent, it is at odds with the often complex processes 
of cumulative radicalisation that produce such events; because identifying the precise 
point at which murder and atrocity became a project of annihilation is difficult (if not 
impossible) to prove definitively.36 It has also been noted that the concept fails to 
adequately account for the ‘blurring and blending’ of multiple and overlapping identities 
in the situations to which it is applied.37 Furthermore, there are issues around the way in 
which genocide is quantified. Speaking from an historian’s point of view, for example, 
Mark Mazower has criticised the UN’s emphasis on the proportion of an ethnic 
community killed rather than the number of victims. Citing a 1996 case, in which five 
Brazilian miners were convicted of genocide after killing sixteen Yanomami Indians, he 
notes that ‘the lawyer may focus on the similarities with what happened in Rwanda; the 
historian is struck by the differences.’38 
 
In light of these issues and ongoing debates, at least twenty-two scholarly definitions of 
genocide have emerged over the past six decades.39Helen Fein, moreover, has 
identified four sub-categories of genocide, which have different motives, but are all 
eliminationist in intent.40 For our purposes, however, Donald Bloxham’s concise 
summation will suffice: ‘[genocide is] the physical destruction of a large proportion of a 
group in a limited or unlimited territory with the intention of destroying that group’s 
collective existence’.41 Like ethnic cleansing, it can encompass different methods.  
However, it is qualitatively different in that the purpose of ethnic cleansing may not 
necessarily be the total elimination of a group or minority from existence, but to ‘cleanse’ 
such group or minority from a particular area. Whilst the scale of the violence could be 
similar, the literature suggests that the terminal logic of genocide is elimination, whereas 
the logic of ethnic cleansing is the pursuit of all measures, including mass killing, by one 
ethnic group to rid a piece of territory of another, rival group. 
 
This understanding of genocide, we suggest, is broadly in keeping with the spirit of the 
UN convention and majority of scholarly definitions, whilst avoiding certain problematic 
constraints – such as those concerning identity, or an undue emphasis on the state. It is 
also in step with the intuitive notions of the concept which have informed unionist 
allegations of genocide in the Irish borderlands.42 
 
Finally, it is necessary to explore the concept of sectarianism. In the Irish context, 
sectarianism typically refers to the atavistic animosities between the Protestant and 
Catholic communities. It is commonly held as a defining feature of the more recent 
‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland and an important dimension of earlier conflicts throughout 
Ireland as a whole, not least the Irish revolution. More importantly, for our purposes, it is 
also central to the narrative of ethnic cleansing and/or genocide on the Irish border in the 
1920s and 1970s. Despite its ubiquity, however, sectarianism is an under-theorised 
concept,43 with most accounts simply ‘taking the meaning for granted’. 44 Many scholars 
of Irish history and politics use the term intuitively, offering few suggestions as to how it 
should be defined or applied. This is even true of popular survey texts aimed at both an 
academic and general readership.45 
 
Attempts to define sectarianism have largely been confined to the sociological literature 
regarding the recent troubles in Northern Ireland, and have varied considerably. Perhaps 
the most useful general definition, however, is that of John Brewer: ‘[sectarianism is] the 
determination of actions, attitudes and practices by beliefs about religious difference, 
which results in their being invoked as the boundary marker to represent social 
stratification and conflict.’ Among sectarianism’s key features, he contends, is the 
assignation of difference to particular groups.46 
 
Nevertheless, as recent scholarship on the Middle and Far East suggests, defining 
sectarianism is complicated by the fact that it is intertwined with ethnicity, identity, and 
nationalism.47 Likewise, in the Irish context, finding an adequate definition is complicated 
by a complex intersection of religious, political and cultural identity. This problem is 
perhaps most obvious amid discussions of violence, where debates about the 
applicability of the sectarian epithet reveal significant variations in how it is framed. 
Looking to the historical literature on the 1920s, for instance, there is a noticeable 
(though largely unspoken) division between those who view sectarianism in terms of 
ethnicity and those who view it more narrowly in terms of religion. Similar differences in 
emphasis can also be observed amid scholarly debates as to whether (and to what 
extent) the PIRA campaign was motivated by sectarianism. 
 
Crucially, Brewer notes that sectarianism can involve both intentional and unintentional 
discrimination. Intentional discrimination refers to acts or policies of unequal treatment 
that are predicated on religious difference. Unintentional discrimination refers to acts or 
policies whose consequences ‘are discriminatory even though this was not intended.’48 
Similarly, Tim Wilson has suggested that the sectarian significance of violence in Ulster 
in the early 1920s owes less to the motives or intents of its perpetrators, and more to the 
way it is interpreted by the community at large. Drawing on Frank Wright’s concept of 
‘representative violence’, he argues that ‘most acts of violence tended to be interpreted 
in terms of the overarching communal conflict […] communal identities of protagonists 
were stressed over local or interpersonal factors.’49 
 
We therefore suggest that sectarianism is best understood as discrimination against or 
holding of discriminatory attitudes towards a person or group of persons because of their 
religious background. Following Brewer, an act or acts can be sectarian in consequence 
if not necessarily in intent. Sectarian violence, then, is violence directed against a person 
or group of persons because of their religious background (in the Irish case, Catholic or 
Protestant). However, as the following analysis demonstrates, such a definition will fall 
short if we seek to understand the manifestations of and motivations behind political 
violence in Ireland during both the 1920s and 1970s.50 
 
Therefore, to better understand the nature of republican violence in comparative 
perspective, it is useful to distinguish between violence, motivated purely by religious 
hatred against the target group, and politically motivated violence which may have been 
overwhelmingly experienced by a group sharing a particular religious background, but 
not systematically applied or ideologically motivated by a desire to target or remove the 
group because of their religion. We define this kind of violence as ‘functionally sectarian’ 
violence, and in the following sections we will examine both the 1920s and the 1970s to 
consider its appropriateness to aspects of the republican campaigns in either period. 
This approach aims to move the discussion away from highly politicised language, and 
has potentially useful methodological implications for the study of political violence in 
other divided societies. 
 
The comparative cases: violence during the 1920s and 1970s 
 
The unionist narrative of ethnic cleansing and/or genocide on the Irish border during the 
1920s and the 1970s rests on two main contentions. The first is that IRA and PIRA 
violence constituted a systematic campaign against Protestants, with a view a removing 
them from border districts. Discussion of this point has typically focused on incidents of 
murderous violence, with no differentiation between civilian victims or members of the 
security forces (many of them part-timers or reservists).51 Second, it is alleged that 
sectarian killing was accompanied by a more obscure, but concerted, economic 
campaign. In rural districts, this took the form of land-grabbing, which was often 
facilitated by acts of violence and intimidation. In towns, meanwhile, it was evidenced in 
attacks on the ‘Protestant economy’ – notably, Protestant-owned businesses and the 
economic infrastructure of predominately Protestant areas.52 These latter allegations 
usually relate specifically to the recent troubles, though are potentially paralleled in 
agrarian unrest and economic boycotts of the 1920s. 
 
There are, of course, other aspects to the narrative – the alleged complicity of the Irish 
government, or claims that republicans have shifted their attention to ‘cultural war’ 
(specifically, by contesting Orange parades).53 Yet it remains, first and foremost, a 
commentary on the nature and objectives of militant republican violence. Accordingly, 
we examine three areas of the republican campaigns of the 1920s and 1970s which 
have characterised the ethnic cleansing/genocide debate: reprisal attacks; attacks on 
the security forces; and the targeting of the ‘Protestant economy’. We argue that, in 
none of these cases during either period, can evidence of a concerted campaign of 
ethnic cleansing and/or genocide be discerned. Indeed, at this stage, we can safely rule 
out the latter entirely. The suggestion of genocide on the border rests on little more than 
a conflation of the concept with that of ethnic cleansing. To quote one unionist politician: 
‘whether you want to call it ethnic cleansing or genocide, it amounts to the same thing.’54 
Accordingly, we will focus primarily on the issue of ethnic cleansing. 
 
Drawing on our comparative analysis, moreover, we tentatively suggest that such 
violence failed to develop partly because of the republican movement’s self-imposed 
constraints. This is not to deny that either the IRA or the PIRA were responsible for 
horrendous sectarian violence, or to take their pronouncements or legitimations for such 
violence at face value. Rather, it is to reject the implication that a more substantial 
sectarian massacre or forced exodus was stunted by external factors alone – such as 
the intervention (or lack thereof) of the state, or the resilience of the victimised minority.55 
 
Reprisals 
 
Accusations of ethnic cleansing or genocide on the Irish border are most often made 
with reference to extraordinary episodes of reprisal violence. The most notable examples 
are the Altnaveigh (1922), Tullyvallan (1975), and Kingsmills (1976) massacres, which 
claimed multiple Protestant civilian lives. Such incidents provide an understandable 
emotional impetus for claims that republican violence constituted a systematic attempt to 
‘cleanse’ Protestants from border districts. Yet, such assertions ultimately rest on the 
flawed notion that ethno-sectarian victim selection necessarily involves eliminationist 
intent. Furthermore, by ignoring the exceptionality of such violence, and its inherently 
reciprocal nature, such interpretations obscure their actual logic– deterrence.  
 
That republican reprisals were acts of deterrence is perhaps most clearly illustrated in 
the earlier of our two periods, for which the available sources are most comprehensive. 
Though republicans were responsible for numerous retaliatory incidents along the 
border between 1920 and 1922 – most often in the form of attacks on property or 
individual ‘tit-for-tat’ killings – there were only two large-scale reprisals. These occurred 
at Rosslea, on the Fermanagh-Monaghan border, in March 1921, and at Altnaveigh, 
near Newry, in June 1922. Both were carried out in retaliation for attacks committed 
locally by loyalists, who at the time were primarily organised through the Ulster Special 
Constabulary (USC), an official paramilitary auxiliary to the police. Together the attacks 
claimed nine victims, seven of them civilians. And of these seven civilians, all but one 
was killed at Altnaveigh, which was undoubtedly the more brutal incident.56 
 
At both Rosslea and Altnaveigh, the IRA was pursuing the limited objective of deterring 
violence from their opponents. One of those involved in the reprisal at Rosslea, for 
instance, later recalled his senior officer’s attitude in planning the attacks: ‘when you hit 
them hard they will not strike again.’57 The Altnaveigh reprisal was conceived with similar 
intent. The IRA officer who sanctioned the operation later spoke of having ‘cured those 
Specials [USC] of a tendency to pursue pogrom tactics in south Armagh’, and boasted 
that ‘we hit them back twice as hard and we had them cowed in our area’.58 The fact that 
the victims at Altnaveigh were civilians was rationalised elsewhere by another local IRA 
officer, who claimed that it would ‘make unionist civilians (if any unionists could then be 
classed as civilians) realise that even in their own district they were not immune from 
punishment for the misdeeds of their relatives serving in the “B” Specials.’59 
 
Though abhorrent, this is not the logic of ethnic cleansing. Rather, it is the logic of 
‘representative violence’, a means of communal deterrence in which ‘anyone of a great 
number of people can be “punished” for something done by the community they come 
from’.60 Furthermore, as Wilson has demonstrated, republicans were not unique in this 
respect. Loyalist violence was guided by the same overarching dynamic.61 
 
Like the 1920s, the 1970s witnessed many sectarian ‘tit-for-tat’ killings. The Tullyvallen 
(September 1975) and Kingsmills (January 1976) massacres in County Armagh (both 
close to the border) are among the most notorious. At Tullyvallen, five Protestants were 
murdered whilst attending an Orange Hall. At Kingsmills, eleven Protestants returning 
from work were shot. The one Catholic in their company was released. Both killings were 
claimed by the South Armagh Republican Action Force, a nom de guerre for the local 
PIRA.62 These events proved the PIRA at times engaged in nakedly sectarian acts, but 
do not constitute evidence of systematic ethnic cleansing. According to the perpetrators, 
both attacks were carried out in ‘reprisal’ for the deaths of Catholics in Belfast, although 
were undoubtedly influenced by recent murders of local Catholics.63 The Republican 
News explicitly stated that if loyalists ceased killing Catholics ‘then the question of 
retaliation from whatever source will not arise’.64 There is also evidence that some PIRA 
leaders opposed the reprisals because of their sectarian implications. 65 Former Officer 
Commanding of the Belfast Brigade, Brendan Hughes, claimed PIRA prisoners wrote to 
the outside leadership complaining about the sectarian aspect to the campaign.66 
 
The PIRA, however, blamed the British state for the sectarian turn in the violence. Gerry 
Adams, writing as ‘Brownie’, claimed the British state was ‘trying to divert the IRA from 
the shooting and bombing war’ against the police.67 Nevertheless, it was not until the 
late-1980s that reprisal policy changed. From then, the PIRA stated that only those 
directly involved in loyalist killing should be targeted (although there were occasional 
exceptions). This was not always welcomed by rank-and-file members in particular 
locales, but, under Adams’s leadership, retaliations along the lines of Kingsmills were 
generally forbidden.68 
 
As during the 1920s, therefore, republicans envisioned reprisals as a means of deterring 
loyalist violence. And, like the 1920s, these reprisals involved ethno-sectarian victim 
selection through the logic of ‘representative violence’. The fact that such practices were 
brutal is undisputable. And that many Protestants perceived them as an existential threat 
to their culture and way-of-life is understandable.69 They were also, arguably, counter-
productive at least in the long-term. Although some republicans, at the time, argued that 
Kingsmills stopped the tit-for-tat spiral of killings in the area, and thus served the PIRA’s 
purpose.70 However morally abhorrent this logic is, it does not provide a compelling case 
that republican violence constituted an attempted ‘cleansing’ of the Protestant population 
in the border areas. 
 
Attacks on the Members of the Security Forces 
Republican attacks on the security forces present a particular difficulty for the discussion 
of ethnic or sectarian violence along the border. The vast majority of locally recruited 
personnel – that is members of the USC in the early 1920s, and members of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) or Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) in the 1970s – were 
Protestants. Many were part-timers or reservists who served in their locales, but 
otherwise led civilian lives. The distinction between civilian and combatant was thus 
blurred. These individuals were at once combatants and representatives of the broader 
Protestant community. From a republican perspective, they were logical military targets. 
From a unionist perspective, however, they were co-religionists and communal cohorts. 
For this reason, therefore, we argue that this strand of violence is best understood as 
functionally sectarian.  
 
This was certainly the case during the 1920s. Prior to the creation of the USC in late 
1920, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) bore the brunt of the republican campaign. 
Consequently, the victims were often Catholic, and although they may have been well 
integrated into the communities in which they served, they were rarely native to it – RIC 
constables being forbidden to serve in their home counties.71 With the introduction of the 
USC, however, IRA attacks on the security forces acquired a sectarian significance. 
Furthermore, if the victim was a B-Special – a part-time constable who patrolled his 
home district one night per week – it would also carry specific local resonances. 
USC constables, like their RIC comrades, were attacked whether on or off duty. 
Their homes and loved ones were liable to be targeted in reprisal operations, the 
reasoning for which has already been discussed. During the first six months of 1922, 
many were abducted and held prisoner south of the border for the purpose of 
negotiating prisoner exchanges.72 Again, this was likely to occur whether a constable 
was on or off duty. Indeed, many were ‘arrested’ by republican forces after crossing the 
border to attend agricultural fairs, or to sell produce.73 In addition to direct attacks on 
personnel, other aspects of the IRA’s campaign against the USC had a broader 
sectarian impact. Orange Halls, for example, were sometimes targeted as a result of 
their (real or imagined) connections to the force; in some districts they served as 
meeting places and equipment stores for B Special patrols.74 
 
Yet although sectarianism should not be ignored as a factor in such violence, neither 
should it be seized upon as its primary motivation. Ultimately the victims were 
combatants, and this was a much more salient factor in determining their fate. 
Nevertheless, this violence was functionally sectarian in its impact upon the Protestant-
unionist community. It was ultimately understood in terms of sectarianism, sometimes to 
the extent of precipitating sectarian reprisals against the Catholic-nationalist 
community.75 
 
Likewise, during the 1970s, PIRA attacks on the security forces are perhaps the clearest 
example of how its campaign of violence was functionally sectarian. The PIRA’s 
campaign in border areas primarily targeted British and local security forces. Even 
during the so-called 1975 IRA/British truce, the North Armagh PIRA warned that ‘British 
patrols’ were at risk ‘at all times’.76 It also warned that the truce excluded the ‘Orange 
police [RUC]’.77 Prison officers were also at risk. In 1977, the PIRA stated it would ‘hunt 
down’ prison officers, ‘an important cog in the British war machine’.78 
 
Since the early 1970s, the PIRA’s focus had shifted from urban to border areas. This 
followed security force successes in curtailing the PIRA in Belfast and Derry.79 Security 
force personnel and installations in border areas were targeted in ‘hit and run’ style 
attacks. Those responsible often escaped to the Republic, evading capture.80 
Furthermore, the late 1970s saw an ‘Ulsterisation’ of the conflict– with local security 
forces increasingly replacing British troops. The RUC and (mostly part-time) Army 
reserve, the UDR, were crucial to this strategy.81  
 
For the PIRA, however, members of these forces were considered ‘legitimate’ targets, 
whether on or off duty, since (they argued) they could have been ‘gathering intelligence’ 
on PIRA members at any time. Part-time members of the security forces were regularly 
attacked by PIRA units in border regions during the 1970s. The PIRA thus claimed the 
targeting was motivated by ‘military necessity’ rather than ‘pure revenge’.82 As in the 
1920s, the sectarian implications of this targeting were obvious. The Protestant 
community experienced these deaths as a ‘communal loss’.83  Howsoever morally 
dubious, the attacks had an essential political, tactical and strategic logic. But they were 
not part of a wider plan to ‘ethnically cleanse’ Protestants from border regions. 
 
Targeting of ‘Protestant economy’ 
 
Following Petrovic’s definition, the targeting of the ‘Protestant economy’ might constitute 
ethnic cleansing if it was systematic, and conducted with an intent to force the Protestant 
population to flee, either in whole or substantial part, from a given area. In this respect, 
the suggestion that ethnic cleansing was pursued through a concerted and aggressive 
campaign of land acquisition can be dismissed. Although such incidents did occur, they 
were too few in number and too incoherent to constitute a systematic effort. 
 
During the earlier of our two periods, detailed returns of agrarian incidents between May 
1920 and November 1921 record fewer than ten occurrences across counties Armagh, 
Down, Londonderry, Fermanagh and Tyrone.84 There is, moreover, little to suggest that 
they became any more substantial in the following seven months, after which IRA 
violence in Northern Ireland sharply declined.85 The same is true of the 1970s; 
widespread violence regarding land ownership was not a feature of the conflict. 86 
Furthermore, sectarian competition over land – in which the ‘ownership of a farm 
[means] the symbolic occupation of an area’ – is a long-standing (indeed, continuing) 
feature of communal relations in rural Ulster.87 Such attitudes, and their associated 
practices, were not unique to the conflicts of the 1920s or 1970s. And although the 
violence and instability of these periods may have intensified such antagonisms, and 
imbued them with sinister connotations, there is little to suggest any substantial change 
in their essential nature. 
 
Two other aspects of the republican campaigns are less clear cut, however; the Belfast 
boycott in the 1920s, and the PIRA’s economic campaign in the 1970s (and thereafter). 
Both could certainly qualify as systematic, since they represented coordinated strategic 
policies. But did they constitute ethnic cleansing? The Belfast boycott was instigated by 
Dail Eireann, the republican movement’s revolutionary assembly, in August 1920. It was 
suggested by a number of prominent Belfast republicans as a response to the 
expulsions of Catholic workers from the city’s shipyards, and intense inter-communal 
rioting, labelled as a ‘pogrom’ by nationalists and republicans.88 Yet the policy was also 
clearly envisaged as a means combating partition – which the British government was in 
the process of legislating.  
 
By exerting economic pressure on northern unionist business interests, it was argued, 
the boycott would ‘make Belfast realise that it is in Ireland and must be of Ireland.’89 
The boycott was implemented throughout Ireland, and in the soon-to-be border districts 
of Ulster it was pursued with particular enthusiasm (though varying levels of persistence) 
until 1922. Suppliers and consumers alike were encouraged to boycott goods, and avoid 
doing business with Belfast based financial institutions. Those who did not comply – 
traders, organisations, individual consumers – faced various forms of pressure and 
intimidation, including visits from the IRA or inclusion on public blacklists. The IRA also 
engaged in direct acts of destruction and sabotage targeting Belfast goods and firms, as 
well as non-compliant local traders.90 
 
As suggested above, the Belfast boycott was certainly systematic. Yet it did not 
constitute ethnic cleansing for two reasons. First, there was no intent to coerce 
Protestants/unionists to flee. Rather, it represented an attempt to force their inclusion in 
the Irish nation (as imagined by republicans). As flawed and naive as this was, it was 
nonetheless assimilationist. Second, though unionist business interests were the main 
target, and Protestants thus its primary victims, the violence and intimidation surrounding 
the project was not confined to unionists. Catholics – both nationalist and republican – 
faced similar treatment. Boycott blacklists posted in Newry in December 1921, for 
example, included local branches of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, a Sinn Fein 
controlled district council, and the nationalist MP for South Armagh.91 Indeed, in this 
regard, the boycott and its associated activities are perhaps best understood as being 
functionally sectarian. 
 
Similarly, during the 1970s, the PIRA’s attacked infrastructure and economic targets, to 
pressurise the British government, for example destroying the cross-border electricity 
interconnector.92 The PIRA’s logic was explained by Derry IRA leader Martin 
McGuinness in 1972: ‘We are prepared to bomb any building that will cause economic 
devastation and put pressure on the Government’. 93 This tactic was common to other 
nationalist groups, such as Basque separatists Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).94 
 
The victims of this campaign comprised all religious backgrounds. And predominantly 
unionist towns were by no means exclusively targeted, as one would expect if a 
campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was underway. Largely nationalist Strabane was 
particularly affected. The PIRA even dropped milk-churn bombs from helicopters on this 
border town in 1974.95 Foreign industrialists were also targeted. Thomas Niedermeyer of 
Grundig was kidnapped and killed by the PIRA in December 1973. Consequently, 
Grundig decided against expanding its business in the border town of Newry.96 
 
Whilst affecting the whole community, the victims of some attacks on businesses were 
overwhelmingly Protestant. One such attack was The La Mon Hotel bombing on 17 
February 1978. Whilst not located in a border area, the border is central to the La Mon 
narrative, since it was suggested the perpetrators fled to safety in the Irish Republic.97 
 
An incendiary device was detonated, killing 12 people. Another 30 were burned, some 
horrifically. The PIRA admitted responsibility, and accepted its warning was 
inadequate.98 La Mon was apparently targeted because it was believed RUC officers 
were meeting there, but this meeting occurred a week previously.99 All those killed at La 
Mon were Protestants. The intended targets had been RUC officers, most likely from the 
Protestant community. The attack, therefore, had sectarian implications. However, what 
characterised La Mon was its ‘indiscriminate’ nature.100 This was true of most PIRA 
bombs, which killed and maimed members of both communities.101 The La Mon attack 
was a sordid act of gratuitous violence, but it was not part of a concerted campaign of 
ethnic cleansing. Rather it is best understood as functionally sectarian in nature, given 
its traumatic effects on the Protestant community. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has demonstrated that republican violence in border regions during the 
1920s and 1970s, contrary to the claims of both academics and contemporary 
politicians, cannot properly be understood as ethnic cleansing or genocide. There was 
no systematic attempt to ‘cleanse’ members of the Protestant/unionist community from 
border districts. That does not mean that violence did not often have sectarian 
implications. Evidently it did, and the criticism of some of the more gratuitous incidences 
of sectarianism by senior republicans during both periods is a striking testament to that 
fact.  
 
However, we have argued that this violence is best understood as functionally sectarian, 
whereby republican violence was, in particular cases, overwhelmingly experienced by 
members of the Protestant community, but was not directed at them simply because 
they were Protestants. To conclude that such violence was evidence of ethnic cleansing 
would require evidence either of a plan to eliminate Protestants and unionists from 
border areas, or practical evidence that republicans were waging a total war against that 
community. We have found no such evidence. 
 
Furthermore, accepting that violence against the Protestant/unionist community was 
ethnic cleansing would logically require us to conclude that killings overwhelmingly 
affecting members of the Catholic/nationalist community constitute evidence of a parallel 
campaign of ethnic cleansing by loyalist paramilitaries, whether working alone or in 
concert with the state. Instead, the evidence suggests that religion and ethnicity were 
not the sole reasons for the targeting of members of the Protestant community. The 
following grisly example from Bosnia offers an interesting analogy. 
 
As Stathis Kalyvas has argued, the Muslims killed as part of the Prijedor Massacre in 
1992 ‘constituted a general pool of targets for revenge-oriented violence by the Serbs’. 
However, the specific targets tended to be selected ‘on the basis of individual 
characteristics, such as their past actions’.102 During both periods in Ireland, similar logic 
informed republican victim selection. Many members of the Protestant community were 
thus attacked because of their (perceived or actual) involvement with security forces, but 
not because they were Protestants per se. In this, as Kalyvas has also suggested, local 
contexts are highly important. This was particularly true in Ireland, where the logic of 
representative violence as a form of communal deterrence was in evidence.103 As is the 
case during civil wars, the convergence between republicans’ ‘local motives’ and their 
‘supralocal imperatives’ led to violence that intersected between ‘the political and the 
private, the collective and the individual’.104 Unlike Bosnia, however, the violence in 
Northern Ireland never assumed an eliminationist character. 
 
Perhaps a more puzzling question for scholars of political violence is why no systematic 
campaign of ethnic cleansing was carried out (by either side) during these periods. Why 
did Irish groups not abandon ‘moral restraint’ and engage in ethnic cleansing and 
genocide?105 As mentioned, republican leaders during both periods were condemnatory 
of the most notorious excesses during the conflict.106 However, the absence of more 
extreme violence can perhaps be partially explained by what (or who) republicans 
considered as comprising the ‘Irish nation’. For republicans, Protestants and unionists 
were not considered a different ethnicity, but an integral part of the ‘imagined 
community’ of the Irish nation.107 Unionists were regarded even by militant republicans 
as fellow Irishmen, albeit deluded into believing they were British by colonial oppression. 
This was certainly the case in the 1920s, even among IRA hard-liners such as Eoin 
O’Duffy.108 Similarly, the Official IRA Chief-of-Staff, Cathal Goulding referred to the 
1970s as a time when ‘Irishmen had been killing Irishmen with obscene enthusiasm’; 
and further that a ‘great many of our fellow Irishmen are unionists’.109 The PIRA held 
similar views, arguing that unionists were ethnically Irish not British, but were victims of 
false consciousness. The British presence encouraged unionist obstinacy, and had to be 
removed before unionists embraced their Irish nationality.110 Throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, Irish nationalist analysis of unionism had largely taken this 
form.111 Howsoever naive this was, and however contradictory it appears alongside other 
strands of republican thought and practice, there is little evidence it was insincere. As 
much as some scholars may baulk at an ideological explanation for the apparent 
restraint of the republican movements of the 1920s and 1970s, it is nonetheless clear 
that they lacked a sufficiently powerful ideological narrative – or doctrine – for the 
justification of a mass sectarian slaughter.112  
 
Even so, this is only part of the picture. The avowed non-sectarianism of Irish 
republicanism also had a darker side, exuding what Richard English has described as ‘a 
sense of superior morality’ – typical of nationalisms – in which bigotry is seen ‘as 
something which is the preserve of Protestants’. 113 It seems fair to suggest that this 
ultimately served to blind successive republican movements to the inherent sectarianism 
(functional or otherwise) of much of the violence they did commit. Ideological non-
sectarianism, therefore, appears to have served (somewhat paradoxically) to both 
facilitate and limit the sectarian violence of the IRA and the PIRA.  
 
A nationalistic sense of superior morality is not merely the preserve of republicans alone, 
however. It is also central to unionist allegations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the 1920s and 
1970s. As English has noted with regard to Irish nationalists, a sense of ‘victimhood at 
the hands of enemy villains’ has often been crucial to such claims, and not infrequently 
involves the construction of grossly distorted historical narratives.114 Arguments 
concerning ethnic cleansing during the two periods, then, appear to be driven by political 
considerations, rather than dispassionate analysis of evidence. Instead, the ethnic 
cleansing debate is part of an ongoing political argument concerning the memory of the 
conflict, manifesting as (conscious or unconscious) efforts to monopolise victimhood or 
absolve elements of each community of responsibility for the troubles.115 
 
These kinds of responses are not unusual in post-conflict contexts. The ‘official history’ 
of the Rwandan genocide, with blame apportioned to one community, offers one of the 
more extreme instances of the monopolisation of victimhood, despite evidence that it 
provides an incomplete account of those horrific events.116 This is not, of course, to 
compare the events that occurred in Rwanda with those of Northern Ireland; but to 
illustrate similar trends concerning the politics of historical memory in post-conflict 
societies. 
 
Given the continuing relevance of such debates, it might be questioned why scholars 
have not devoted more time to comparing violence on the Irish border during the 1920s 
and the 1970s, given the similarities concerning the allegations. Contemporary politics 
might, again, be one explanation.117 In the Republic of Ireland, particularly, 
commentators and politicians alike have been keen to stress the differences between 
the PIRA and the IRA that founded the southern state,118 although journalists such as 
Kevin Myers have referenced Patterson’s recent book in seemingly endorsing an ethnic 
cleansing narrative that highlights similarities between both periods.119 As this article has 
shown, there were indeed some similarities in terms of the violence that each group 
perpetrated – its forms, dynamics, logics and (indeed) its limits. Both, of course, also 
perpetrated acts of violence that contributed to a bitter legacy that is still keenly felt in 
Northern Ireland.  
 
Nevertheless, during neither period was there a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing 
against the Protestant/unionist community. In attempting to explain the violence of both 
periods as functionally sectarian, this article has provided an alternative way of 
understanding inter-communal violence, divorced from contemporary political cul-de-
sacs, and rooted in contextual understandings about motives and outcomes. With 
sectarianism and inter-communal violence rising globally, it is hoped this approach will 
have implications for our understandings of political violence within and beyond Ireland. 
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